Virginia Bar Exam, July 2016, Section 2 by unknown
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Virginia Bar Exam Archive
7-26-2016
Virginia Bar Exam, July 2016, Section 2
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-barexam
Part of the Legal Education Commons
This Bar Exam is brought to you for free and open access by Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Virginia Bar Exam Archive by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Virginia Bar Exam, July 2016, Section 2" (2016). Virginia Bar Exam Archive. 196.
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/va-barexam/196
SECTION TWO   PAGE 1 
 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Roanoke, Virginia – July 26, 2016 
 
GREEN BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 6 in the GREEN Answer Booklet 6 
 
 6. Lincoln Insurance Company (“Lincoln”) provided property insurance coverage for real 
and personal property owned by George Mason University (“GMU”).  Lincoln is an Illinois 
corporation with its executive officers, including its president, chief operating officer and chief 
financial officer, in Chicago, Illinois. Lincoln’s worldwide advertising office is located in Tysons, 
Virginia.  Lincoln is qualified to do business in Virginia as a foreign corporation, according to the 
Virginia State Corporation Commission. 
  
GMU is a public (or “state”) university.  The Code of Virginia provides that GMU is “subject 
at all times to the control of the General Assembly” and that the real and personal property of GMU is 
“the property of the Commonwealth of Virginia.” 
 
 In the last week of April 2015, following a storm, rainwater flooded certain buildings on 
GMU’s campus in the City of Fairfax, Virginia (“City”), causing $2.5 million in property damage.  
GMU timely filed an insurance claim of $2.5 million, which following investigation, was fully paid 
by Lincoln. 
 
 Lincoln, as subrogee of GMU, thereafter sued the City of Fairfax in the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia.  The complaint alleged that the City’s negligence in the planning, 
design, engineering, construction and maintenance of its storm sewer system caused the flooding of 
the GMU campus, and sought to recover the $2.5 million on two theories:  first, that the City by its 
negligence created a legal nuisance, and second, that the damage resulting therefrom was a 
compensable “taking” of GMU’s property by the City in violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the 
Virginia Constitution, which provides that, “[n]o private property shall be damaged or taken for 
public use without just compensation to the owner thereof.” 
  
 The City’s attorneys timely filed an answer, including affirmative defenses, and a motion to 
dismiss on the grounds that (1) the District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that GMU 
is an indispensable, real party in interest, the joinder of which would destroy diversity of citizenship, 
and (2) the complaint’s claims are barred by Section 15.2-970 of the Code of Virginia, which states in 
part: 
   
A. Any locality may construct a dam, levee, seawall or other structure or device … 
hereinafter referred to as “works,” the purpose of which is to prevent the tidal erosion, 
flooding or inundation of such locality, or part thereof… 
 
B. No person, association, or political subdivision shall bring any action at law or suit in 
equity against any locality because of, or arising out of, the design, maintenance, performance, 
operation or existence of such works but nothing herein shall prevent any such action or suit 
based upon a written contract.  This provision shall not be construed to authorize the taking of 
private property without just compensation therefor and provided further that the tidal erosion, 
flooding or inundation of any lands of any other person by the construction of a dam or levee 
to impound or control fresh water shall be a taking of such land within the meaning of the 
foregoing provision. 
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 The parties have stipulated that the City is a “locality” and that that the City’s storm sewer 
system is a “work” as those terms are used in Section 15.2-970 above.  Also, it is undisputed that the 
City was negligent in the construction and maintenance of its storm sewer system. 
 
  The District Court judge asks you, as her law clerk, to answer the following questions: 
 
(a) How should the Court rule (i) on the merits of the City’s argument that 
GMU is an indispensable, real party in interest, and (ii) on the motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) On the facts, could Lincoln prove that the City created a legal nuisance, and 
may Lincoln recover on such a claim?  Explain fully. 
 
(c) On the facts, could Lincoln prove that the damage caused by the flooding 
was a “taking” of GMU’s property, and may Lincoln recover on such a 
claim?  Explain fully. 
  
* * * * * 
PURPLE BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 7 in the PURPLE Answer Booklet 7 
 
7. Cassius Ali (“Ali”), CEO of Fight Club International, LLC (“Fight Club”), a 
franchisor of boxing fitness centers, located in Richmond, Virginia, usually kept the company 
checkbook on the desk in his private office.  All of the checks were imprinted with Fight Club’s name 
and address and words “Chief Executive Officer” beneath the signature line.  The checking account 
was maintained at RVA Bank. 
 
  Sonny Frazier (“Frazier”) was a salesman working for Fight Club.  One weekend after 
working late, Frazier entered Ali’s office and saw the checkbook.  He stole a blank check, made it out 
to himself for $4,500, and, being familiar with Ali’s signature, carefully signed a reasonable facsimile 
of it on the signature line. 
 
Frazier purchased and took delivery of a new Apple desktop computer and four Apple 
iPhones from Computer City, a local electronics dealer, and endorsed the stolen check with his own 
name.  Computer City accepted the check in payment for the computer and iPhones.  Frazier then left 
town, and his whereabouts are unknown.  Computer City presented the check to RVA Bank, which 
paid the check in cash. 
 
When Ali received the next monthly statement from RVA Bank, he noticed the $4,500 
cancelled check.  He immediately notified RVA Bank that it was a forged check and demanded that 
the bank credit Fight Club’s account with $4,500. 
 
(a) Must RVA Bank credit Fight Club’s account?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) What arguments should Computer City make in response to a suit by RVA 
Bank to recover the $4,500 from Computer City?  Explain fully. 
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* * * * * 
GOLD BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 8 in the GOLD Answer Booklet 8 
 
8.  Scout, an investment banker from Norfolk, Virginia, needed a break from the 
corporate world and decided to go on a “thru-hike” of the Appalachian Trail, backpacking from 
Georgia to Maine.  Before she left, Scout dropped off her guitar, weight-lifting equipment, and fish 
tank at her friend Jimmy’s house.  Jimmy agreed to store the property in his basement at no charge. 
 
 Scout signed an enforceable contract with Point to Point, Inc., an automobile transportation 
company, to ship her car to her grandmother’s house in Richmond, Virginia, where Scout intended to 
pick up the car upon completion of her trip. 
 
Scout delivered the remainder of her personal possessions to Friendly Storage, a local storage 
facility.  Scout entered into an enforceable contract with Friendly Storage and paid in full the storage 
fees for the upcoming year to avoid the hassle of payment during her trip.  With the peace of mind 
that her possessions were in good hands, Scout embarked on her adventure. 
  
 While Scout was traversing the Appalachian Trail, the moisture in Jimmy’s basement—as a 
result of the unpredictably high rainfall—caused irreparable damage to Scout’s guitar. 
   
 Instead of delivering Scout’s car to her grandmother’s house, Point to Point, Inc. delivered the 
car to the homeless shelter next door.  The homeless shelter, believing the car to be a donation, sold it 
to Morgan (the head of household of a local needy family) for $1,000, which, consistent with disposal 
of donated property, was much less than the $4,000 retail value of the car. 
 
 To make matters worse, only a month after Scout paid him, the owner of Friendly Storage 
mistakenly confused Scout’s storage locker for that of a delinquent customer.  At a blind bulk auction 
where potential buyers bid on the entire contents sight unseen, the high bidder paid almost 200% of 
the value of Scout’s possessions. 
  
 Having decided to go completely “off the grid” during her trek, Scout was unaware of these 
happenings until she returned many months later.  Upon her return, Scout’s feeling of personal 
accomplishment quickly turned to distress when she realized what happened to her belongings in her 
absence. 
  
(a) Is Scout likely to prevail in a suit for negligence against Jimmy to recover 
for the damage to her guitar?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) Is there an action Scout can file against Morgan in General District Court 
to recover the car, and is Scout likely to prevail?  Explain fully. 
 
(c) On what theories may Scout state a claim against Friendly Storage to 
recover for the loss of her personal possessions; is she likely to prevail on 
each; and how much would she be entitled to recover if she prevails?  
Explain fully. 
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* * * * * 
 
ORANGE BOOKLET - Write your answer to Question 9 in the ORANGE Answer Booklet 9 
 
 9. Blake is the owner of Spartan Metal Buildings, Inc., (“SMB”), a metal fabricator 
located in an industrial park in Salem, Virginia.  Periodically, SMB needs to clear its storage yard of 
accumulated scrap metal. 
   
 One day at lunch with his friend Drew, who had just been laid off from his job, Blake was 
complaining about having to do the cleanup.  Drew said he needed the work and asked Blake if he 
could help with the cleanup, take away the scrap metal on his flatbed truck, and, by way of 
compensation, sell the scrap metal and keep the proceeds.  Blake agreed, and they met later that 
afternoon in the SMB yard. 
   
 For two hours, Blake directed his employees and Drew as they moved all of the scrap metal 
into a large pile.  Blake operated a crane to load some of the larger pieces on the back of Drew’s 
flatbed truck.  While moving one of the larger pieces, Drew tried to guide it onto the truck.  At that 
time, the crane was dangerously close to a power line which crossed the yard.  The metal piece Drew 
was guiding onto the truck came into contact with the power line and Drew was severely burned.  
Drew survived the incident but amassed over $400,000 in medical expenses to be treated for his 
injuries.  He filed a claim with SMB’s insurance carrier for workers’ compensation benefits, but the 
claim was denied. 
  
   Drew filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Salem alleging negligence against 
Blake and SMB (“Defendants”) for personal injuries that he sustained.  The Defendants answered 
with a general denial.  When Blake was deposed in the discovery process, he testified:  (1) that he 
was aware of the low height of the electrical line across the yard; (2) he should have warned Drew to 
stay clear from the crane and the scrap metal being moved; and (3) he was distracted just prior to the 
incident when his cell phone vibrated in his rear pocket, and he was reaching to check it when the 
incident occurred. 
   
 Drew filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Blake and SMB (under a theory of 
respondeat superior) were negligent as a matter of law based upon Blake’s own party admissions 
made in his deposition.  The Defendants opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that (1) 
Drew, as a plaintiff, is not entitled to move for summary judgment, and (2) in the alternative, 
summary judgment cannot be granted because the motion relies upon Blake’s deposition testimony.  
The Circuit Court for the City of Salem agreed with both of the Defendants’ arguments and denied 
the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
 
 A month before trial, the Defendants filed a Plea in Bar alleging that the Circuit Court had no 
subject matter jurisdiction over Drew’s claim because at the time of the accident Drew was a 
“statutory employee” of SMB whose exclusive remedy for his injuries was under the Virginia 
Workers’ Compensation Act.  Drew filed a Response in Opposition to the Plea in Bar asserting only 
that the Defendants waived any objection to jurisdiction because they had not raised this defense in 
their Answer to the Complaint. 
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 By Final Order dated May 22, 2016, the Circuit Court granted the Defendants’ Plea in Bar, 
holding that Drew was a statutory employee of Blake and SMB and that subject matter jurisdiction 
could not be waived by the Defendants. 
 
 On June 15, 2016, Drew filed a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk of the Circuit Court.  He 
believes, but is uncertain, that he has an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia as a matter of right.  
He intends to base his appeal on the following assignments of error: 
 
1. That the trial court erred in denying his Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds 
that it did. 
 
2. That the Defendants’ “exclusive remedy” jurisdictional objection was waived because it 
was not raised as a defense in their Answer to the Complaint. 
 
3. The Defendants should have been estopped from asserting the jurisdictional objection 
because SMB’s insurance carrier denied his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. 
 
(a) Did Drew timely file his Notice of Appeal?  Explain fully. 
 
(b) Does Drew have an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia as a matter of 
right?  Explain fully. 
 
(c) If his case properly comes before the Supreme Court of Virginia, what 
disposition will the Court make on each of the enumerated assignments of 
error?  Explain fully. 
 
 
* * * * * 
 
